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A DISTRACTION IN DISGUISE:  
HOW A FOCUS ON REGULATING THE PROXY-ADVISORY INDUSTRY FAILS TO 
ADDRESS THE UNNECESSARY CREATION OF AN EXTRA LAYER OF CONFLICT 
Donna D. Musolli 
INTRODUCTION 
 If you have taken your loved ones out for dinner to Applebee’s, worn a suit from Hugo 
Boss, or hiked covered in outdoor gear from Helly Hansen, you have felt the impact of the 
Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan (“OTPP”)1, a private institutional-shareholder organization that 
has assets in all of the aforementioned publically traded companies. Institutional-shareholder 
organizations – like OTPP – invest large, aggregated pools of capital into the open market. For 
example, as of December 31, 2015, the OTPP managed $171.4 (Canadian dollars) billion in net 
assets, investing the assets of roughly 316,000 working and retired Ontario teachers into many 
different companies.
2
 A pension plan is only one form that an institutional-investment 
organization may come in; other organizations come in the form of mutual funds
3
, insurance 
companies, banks or hedge funds.
4
 With such large aggregations of assets, the presence of 
institutional-shareholder organizations can be seen and felt in a large number of publically traded 
companies that impact the day-to-day lives of a plethora of individuals.  
                                                          
1
 Chris Taylor, These Canadians Own Your Town, FORTUNE, December 2, 2015, 
http://fortune.com/2015/12/02/ontario-teachers-pension-fund/  
2
 See generally, ONTARIO TEACHERS’ PENSION PLAN, https://www.otpp.com/corporate/about-teachers (last visited 
March 11, 2017).  
3
 See generally T. ROWE PRICE, https://www3.troweprice.com/usis/personal-investing/home.html (last visited March 
24, 2017) (T. Rowe Price offers mutual-fund services and, thus, is an example of a mutual-fund institutional 
investor); see also BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/investing/financial-professionals/defined-
contribution/investor-pulse (last visited March 24, 2017) (BlackRock is another institution that offers mutual-fund 
services). 
4
 This paper will primarily focus on the regulatory regime that mainly surrounds and impacts pension plans and 
mutual funds. Although it recognizes that institutional shareholders may come in the form of insurance companies, 
banks or hedge funds, this paper will not analyze any specific regulatory practices regarding these entities. 
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This industry’s growth came with time, however; the influential presence of institutional-
shareholder organizations was not as large years ago as it is today. For example, “[i]n the 1950s, 
it was estimated that institutional shareholders [only] held shares representing approximately 10 
percent of the wealth invested in publically traded companies.”5 By the 1990s, this number 
leaped to 50 percent.
6
 And, as of 2012, the shares of institutional shareholders represented 
roughly 75 percent of all shares held in publically traded companies.
7
  The expansion of this 
industry can even be seen by solely examining one type of institutional-investment organization: 
mutual funds. In 1992, mutual funds only represented 7.4 percent of corporate equity in all 
publically traded companies; by 2002, these represented 18 percent, holding “$2.0 trillion in 
publically traded U.S. corporate equity.”8 
 Institutional-shareholder organizations are not only impacting companies they invest in. 
These investment organizations are also changing the face and structural identity of the 
corporate-finance sector. For example, the niche area of institutional-investment corporate 
governance has become an area in corporate finance where women are exerting an increased 
presence in top executive positions.
9
 “The corporate governance heads at seven of the 10 largest 
                                                          
5
 Joseph E. Bachelder III, Institutional Shareholders and Their ‘Oversight’ of Executive Compensation (July 23, 
2012, 9:31 a.m.), HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REGULATION, available at,   
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/23/institutional-shareholders-and-their-oversight-of-executive-
compensation  
6
 Id. 
7
 Id. (citing MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHEN RABIMOV, 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET 
ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPENSATION, CONF. BOARD TRUSTED INSIGHTS FOR BUS. WORLDWIDE 27, 
available at, https://www.conference-board.org/publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=1872&centerId=5) 
(This report indicates that, as of 2009, the average institutional shareholder equity ownership at the top 1,000 U.S. 
corporations was approximately 73 percent. The report also gives a breakdown of the percentages of ownership 
according to certain categories of institutional shareholders). 
8
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, FINAL RULE: DISCLOSURE OF PROXY 
VOTING POLICIES AND PROXY VOTING RECORDS BY REGISTERED MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES (2003), 
available at, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm  
9
 Alexandra Stevenson & Leslie Pickler, A Rare Corner of Finance Where Women Dominate, N.Y. TIMES, January 
16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/business/dealbook/women-corporate-governance-
shareholders.html?_r=0  
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institutional investors in stock are women.”10 And, “[t]hose investors oversee $14 trillion in 
assets.”11  
 In addition to increasing their prominence in general ownership and societal influence, 
institutional-shareholder organizations have, as a result, begun to have a more-established impact 
on voting through their shares, as well. With a larger concentration of shares, institutional 
shareholders have the potential to carry significant clout when it comes to voting on company 
matters.
12
  Institutional shareholders have shown that they are not just sitting on their votes, 
either; they are implementing and utilizing them. In 2016, only 28 percent of retail-held shares 
were voted; in contrast, 91 percent of institutional shares were voted.
13
  
Institutional shareholders’ attempted usage of voting as a bargaining chip was made 
evident when the technology company Snap Inc. (“Snap”), the parent company of Snapchat (a 
tech-based, photo-app venture), announced that it was going to be publically traded. Prior to its 
initial public offering (“IPO”), Snap raised the possibility that public shareholders would have 
zero voting shares once it went public.
14
 Snap is not the first company to adopt this facially 
discriminatory approach in regards to voting. In 2004, Google offered public shareholders one 
vote per share, while board members and insiders received shares that carried 10 votes per 
                                                          
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. 
12
 See Tamara Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for Increased 
Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 385 (2009) (Belinfanti highlights the growth of mutual funds 
– setting forth that these funds are the largest owners of publically traded shares in the United States – and further 
notes that they have, as a result, substantial “voting clout”). 
13
 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2016 U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, November 28, 2016, 
3, available at,  
https://sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2016_U.S._Shareholder_Activism_Review_and_Analys
is.pdf  (citing PROXY PLUS, 2016 PROXY SEASON REVIEW). 
14
 Steven Davidoff Solomon, When Snap Goes Public, Some Shareholders’ Voting Rights May Disappear, N.Y. 
TIMES, January 24, 2017,  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/business/dealbook/when-snap-goes-public-some-
shareholders-voting-rights-may-disappear.html  
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share.
15
 Other tech companies, such as Facebook, Zynga and Groupon, have all followed suit, 
offering dual-class share structures, where founders or owners retain higher voting shares than 
public shareholders.
16
 In effect, this dual-structure voting approach allows these companies to 
figuratively have smaller ownership while retaining more control – serving as a way for public 
companies to say to public shareholders (institutional shareholders included), “give us your 
money, but save your opinion on corporate governance.”  
Word of Snap’s possible no-vote approach immediately triggered a reaction from T. 
Rowe Price, an institutional-shareholder organization, which, as of January 2017, co-managed at 
least $7 million worth of Snap shares.
17
  T. Rowe Price opposed the no-vote approach that Snap 
was likely going to pursue and noted that it was “quietly and persistently advocating for 
change.”18 Prior to this, T. Rowe Price also publically announced that it would, through proxy 
voting, oppose company directors and members of corporate-governance committees that 
supported dual-class share structures.
19
 However, despite this opposition, T. Rowe Price later 
stated that it was in its investors’ best interest to invest in Snap.20 On March 3, 2017, Snap, in 
                                                          
15
 Emily Chasan, Google’s Multi-Class Stock Structure Made Alphabet Move Unique, WALL STREET J. CFO J., 
August 12, 2015, 4:47 p.m., available at, http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2015/08/12/googles-multi-class-stock-structure-
made-alphabet-move-unique/  
16
 Steven Davidoff Solomon, When Snap Goes Public, Some Shareholders’ Voting Rights May Disappear, N.Y. 
TIMES, January 24, 2017,  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/business/dealbook/when-snap-goes-public-some-
shareholders-voting-rights-may-disappear.html 
17
 Paresh Dave, Big Investor T.  Rowe Price Challenges Snapchat Founders’ Power, L.A. TIMES, January 19, 2017, 
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-snapchat-voting-20170119-story.html  
18
 Id. (citing Jonathan Shapiro, T. Rowe Price to Contest Snapchat Founders’ Plan For Voting Shares, AUSTL. FIN. 
REV., January 19, 2017, http://www.afr.com/business/banking-and-finance/financial-services/t-rowe-to-contest-
snapchat-founders-plan-for-voting-shares-20170119-gturaq))  
19
 Lorraine Mirabella, T. Rowe Price Takes Stand Against Stock Structures That Create Unequal Shareholder 
Rights, BALT. SUN, March 19, 2016,  http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-t-rowe-price-oppose-dual-class-
stock-20160319-story.html  
20
 Paresh, supra, n. 17. 
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fact, announced that it would sell 200 million of its shares, maintaining that investors who 
bought Class A stock would have no voting rights.
21
 
The “Snap saga” described above simply shows how the increased concentration of 
institutional-shareholder organizations’ presence on the market can serve as a way for these 
shareholders to exert influence through voting – particularly seen when T. Rowe Price 
announced that it would vote against directors and/or committee members endorsing dual-
structure shares. However, Snap’s journey to its public offering also highlights that institutional-
shareholder organizations have an obligation to factor in the “best interest” of their clients when 
making decisions. Thus, Snap’s approach, in effect, forced T. Rowe Price to weigh its 
disagreement with Snap’s business-judgment decision regarding dual-structured shares against 
the potential profit it could gain from remaining a shareholder of Snap.  
Investment-plan advisers and Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) 
fiduciaries owe their clients a “best interest” analysis because they are fiduciaries to the many 
individuals who contribute their assets to the aggregated pool that gets collected to be invested in 
the open market.
22
 As fiduciaries, investment advisers/plan managers are “not to subordinate the 
                                                          
21
 Caitlin Huston, Snapchat Founders, Investors Cash Out Nearly $1 Billion in Snap IPO, MARKET WATCH, March 
3, 2017, 8:24 p.m., available at, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/snapchat-founders-and-investors-sell-millions-
of-shares-in-snap-ipo-2017-03-01  
22
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS AS 
REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT,  iii 
(2011), available at, https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf (referring to investment advisers 
registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940) [hereinafter “Study on Investment”]; See also U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INFORMATION FOR NEWLY-REGISTERED INVESTMENT ADVISERS (2010), 
available at, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/advoverview.htm; See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (interpreting Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers 
Act”)); See also 29 USC § 1002(21)(A) (Fiduciary duties applied to plan managers of plans under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act: (A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting 
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, 
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or 
other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority 
or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term includes any person designated under 
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interest of their beneficiaries for personal benefit.”23 Investment advisers are fiduciaries that owe 
a duty of loyalty and care to their clients, which means that they are required to eliminate or 
disclose material conflicts.
24
 Fiduciary obligations are applied to investment advisers/plan 
fiduciaries as they vote on behalf of their shareholders through proxies, as well.
25
 What Snap’s 
IPO most poignantly shows is the balancing of power in regards to voting – e.g. it can be utilized 
as a mechanism for power so long as it does not infringe on the best interest of the shareholder. 
With their overwhelming market presence, their increased impact through voting, and the 
need for advisers and plan managers to meet their fiduciary obligations  – particularly, their duty 
of remaining un-conflicted or disclosing such conflicts when voting proxies – institutional-
shareholder organizations began looking to proxy-advisory firms for guidance on how to vote on 
proxies. These proxy-advisory firms, in turn, provide their expertise and research to 
advisers/plan fiduciaries, steering them on what to do when it comes to proxy voting. Can 
advisers/fiduciaries allocate portions of their duties to such proxy firms? To date, yes. And, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
section 405(c)(1)(B) (29 USCS § 1105(c)(1)(B)); see also 29 CFR § 2510.3-21 (this rule defines what type of advice 
must be given to qualify an investment adviser as a fiduciary per ERISA) (Note that the Department of Labor’s 
“Fiduciary Rule” would replace §2510.3-21 and expand the definition of “fiduciary” under ERISA. The Fiduciary 
Rule became effective June 7, 2016 and was set to be applicable April 10, 2017. However, on February 3, 2017, 
President Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum directing the Department of Labor to examine this rule, putting 
the fate of the rule at a stand-still, and the Department of Labor has delayed the implementation of the rule by 60 
days, see Fiduciary Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (April 8, 2016), available at, 
http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=28806; see also 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/completed-rulemaking/1210-AB32-
2; see also http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/14/kl-gates-discusses-fiduciary-rule-delay-important-
compliance-takeaways/#.WPCk-v3uts0.email)). 
23
 Study on Investment, supra, n. 22; see also 29 USC §1104 (2017) (stating that ERISA fiduciaries shall carry out 
duties for exclusive purpose of benefitting its participants).  
24
 Study on Investment, supra, n. 22. 
25
 See 17 C.F.R § 275.206(4)-6 (this rule applies to investment advisers defined in the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 and it notes that investment advisers must consider best interest when voting on behalf of their clients); see 
also Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Secretary, U. S. Department of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of 
the Retirement Board, Avon Products, Inc., (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 ERISA LEXIS 19 at *5 and 6 (this letter applies, 
specifically, to the fiduciary obligations of fiduciaries of ERISA-plan beneficiaries).  
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fact, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”), to some extent, 
has paved the path for this hand-off of duties.
26
   
As of 2016, there were five main proxy advisory firms in the United States: Institutional 
Shareholder Service (“ISS”), Glass Lewis & Co., LLC (“Glass Lewis”), Egan-Jones Proxy 
Services (“Egan Jones”), Marco Consulting Group (“Marco”) and ProxyVote Plus 
(“ProxyVote”).27 Of these five firms, ISS and Glass Lewis are the two firms that dominate the 
proxy-advisory industry.
28
 Based on its long-standing history and reputation, ISS is the most-
dominant proxy advisory firm of the five available firms.
29
 However, Glass Lewis is not far 
behind. As of 2011, Glass Lewis captured over 40 percent of the market share.
30
 While advisers 
and fiduciary plan managers have been turning to these firms, they have also been criticized 
because (1) there are conflicts of interest in how these firms are structured
31
; (2) there is a lack of 
transparency in the analytical models utilized by these firms – thus, there is a lack of certainty as 
                                                          
26
 See Letter from Douglas Schiedt, Associate Director and Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to Kent S. Hughes, Managing Director, Egan-Jones Proxy Services 
(May 27, 2004), archived at, http://perma.cc/KSJ2-JP5N (In this letter, the SEC set forth that an “investment adviser 
could demonstrate that its vote of its clients’ proxies was not a product of conflict of interest if the adviser voted the 
proxies in accordance with a pre-determined policies based on the recommendations of an independent third party. 
An investment adviser that votes client proxies in accordance with a pre-determined policy based on the 
recommendations of an independent third party will not necessarily breach its fiduciary duty of loyalty to its clients 
even though the recommendations may be consistent with the adviser's own interests. In essence, the 
recommendations of a third party that is in fact independent of an investment adviser may cleanse the vote of the 
adviser's conflict.”) [hereinafter “Egan-Jones Letter”]. 
27
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-47  CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS PROXY ADVISORY 
FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 6 (2016), available at, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681050.pdf [hereinafter “GOA 2016”]. 
28
 Id. at 8. 
29
 Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES 
RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING (2007)). 
30
 Tao Li, Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest and Competition in the Proxy Advisory 
Industry, 4 (U. of Warwick Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 389, 2013), available at, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2287196  
31
 CENTER ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY STATUS QUO: 
THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 1 (2011),  available at, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02072011.pdf  [hereinafter “Center on 
Executive Compensation”]. 
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to the accuracy of these firms’ findings32 and (3) these firms’ material creates a conveyance of 
inaccurate information to shareholders
33
.  
Many have responded to some of the issues surrounding proxy-advisory firms with a call 
for increased regulation of the proxy-advisory industry. Some have suggested that the SEC 
model regulations of the proxy-advisory firm to those applied to credit-rating agencies
34
, or that 
the SEC create an oversight board, such as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”) to oversee the proxy-advisory industry.35 Others have further posed the idea of 
mandatory registration for all proxy-advisory firms under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
which would impose stricter disclosure requirements upon industry participants.
36
 And, Congress 
proposed legislation that would have amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to 
require all proxy advisory firms to register under the Exchange Act, which would have exposed 
the proxy-advisory industry to specific disclosure requirements and oversight by the 
Commission.
37
 
What all of these regulatory proposals fail to address is the inherent fiduciary duty that 
lies within the initial institutional portfolio manager – e.g. the investment adviser or plan 
manager/fiduciary who is managing a mutual-fund portfolio or an ERISA plan. These regulatory 
“fixes” fail to address the fact that it is these fiduciaries that should be the arbiters of how and 
why a proxy firm’s services will impact their institutional clients. Thus, this paper is taking the 
position that rather than continuing to attempt to regulate the inherently flawed structure of 
                                                          
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Belinfanti, supra, n. 12 at 432. 
35
 Id. at 436-37. 
36
 Sagiv Edelman, Proxy Advisory Firms: A Guide for Regulatory Reform, 62 EMORY L.J. 169, 1379-81 (2013). 
37
 H.R. 5311, 114
th
 Cong. (2016), available at,  https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr5311/BILLS-114hr5311rh.pdf  
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proxy-advisory firms, governmental agencies should re-shift their focus towards addressing the 
initial fiduciaries that are charged with managing their institutional clients’ portfolios.  
Part I will provide an in-depth breakdown of the initiatives that led to the relationship 
between institutional-shareholder organizations and proxy-advisory firms. Part II will provide 
background information about the two largest proxy-advisory firms and the issues surrounding 
these firms’ presence in the investment market.38 Part III will analyze the inefficiencies of the 
currently existing regulatory framework and proposed regulatory solutions aimed at addressing 
the issues of proxy-advisory firms. Part IV will propose an alternative approach to addressing the 
current relationship between institutional-shareholder organizations and proxy-advisory firms, 
primarily focusing on  how governmental agencies should re-focus resources on ensuring that 
investment advisors (and ERISA-plan fiduciaries) who are initially charged with investing 
institutional shareholders’ assets are managing their clients’ portfolios in the best interest of their 
clients while voting proxies. 
PART I:  
INITIATIVES THAT SOLIDIFIED THE PARAMETERS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL-SHAREHOLDER ORGANIZATIONS AND PROXY-
ADVISORY FIRMS 
There were a series of governmental initiatives that sparked the relationship between 
institutional-shareholder organizations and proxy-advisory firms. This relationship became more 
concrete with time and more pronounced through the actions of the U.S. Department of Labor 
(“DoL”), the SEC and Congress (more broadly). Thus, to better understand the nature of why 
and how institutional-investment organizations turn to proxy advisory firms, an assessment of 
these governmental initiatives is appropriate.  
                                                          
38
 While Part II of this paper will predominantly focus on assessing ISS and Glass Lewis; this paper is not claiming 
or setting forth that the issues and conflicts regarding ISS and/or Glass Lewis are unique to those firms.  
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1. INITIATIVES BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR:  
 
a) The “Avon Letter:” The Beginning of the Path Towards Defining Fiduciary Duties in 
Regards to Proxy Voting 
In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) was passed, and, as 
result, the DoL began “requiring private pension plan fiduciaries to act solely in the interests of 
their plan participants and beneficiaries.”39  
Following the passage of ERISA, in 1988, Allan Lebowitz, then Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Pension Welfare Benefits Administration at the U.S. DoL, sent a letter to the Chairman of 
the Retirement Board of Avon, Inc., Helmuth Fandl.
40
 Years later, this letter from Lebowitz to 
Fandl would become known as the infamous “Avon Letter.” In this letter, the DoL set forth that 
shareholder voting rights are considered “valuable plan assets under ERISA.”41  As such, the 
letter solidified that the duty of prudence also applied to proxy voting.
42
 In sum, the Avon Letter 
established that plan fiduciaries responsible to beneficiaries that fell under ERISA had to be 
cognizant of their duty of prudence when carrying out proxy voting on behalf of such 
beneficiaries. 
b) The DoL’s 2008 Interpretive Bulletin: Fleshing Out How Fiduciaries Are to Carry Out 
Their Duties Regarding Proxy Voting
43
 
                                                          
39
 Center On Executive Compensation, supra, n. 31 at 17; see also 29 USC § 1002(21)(A) (Describing who is a 
fiduciary under ERISA); 29 USC §1104 (Fiduciary shall discharge duties with regards to plan solely in the interest 
of the participants and beneficiaries).  
40
 Id. at 17 (citing Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Secretary, U. S. Department of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, 
Chairman of the Retirement Board, Avon Products, Inc., (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 ERISA LEXIS 19)).   
41
 Id.  
42
 Id. 
43
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN §2509.08–2, FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 73, NO. 202 
(OCTOBER 17, 2008) 61733, available at, https://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocID=21630 
(Pursuant to Sec. 404a of ERISA, plan fiduciaries can appoint investment managers; however fiduciaries still have a 
duty monitor to the investment manager’s activities and investment managers may violate their duties if they do not 
follow terms of statement of investment policy established by named fiduciary). [hereinafter “DoL 2008 Interpretive 
Bulletin”]. 
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On October 17, 2008, the DoL issued an interpretive bulletin that expanded the Avon 
Letter. In its interpretive bulletin, the DoL set forth the following:  
The fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries 
require the responsible fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that may affect the economic 
value of the plan’s investment. However, the fiduciaries also need to take into account 
costs when deciding whether and how to exercise their shareholder rights, including the 
voting of shares. Such costs include, but are not limited to, expenditures related to 
developing proxy resolutions, proxy-voting services and the analysis of the likely net 
effect of a particular issue on the economic value for the plan’s investment. Fiduciaries 
must take all of these factors into account in determining whether the exercise of such 
rights, independently or in conjunction with other shareholders, is expected to have an 
effect on the economic value of the plan’s investment that will outweigh the cost of 
exercising such rights.
44
 
In this same interpretive bulletin, the DoL also addressed the topic of shareholder 
activism. In doing so, the DoL noted that fiduciaries had an obligation to ensure that they were 
voting proxies wisely – thus, with that being set forth, the plan fiduciary must be able to show 
that his or her decision to proxy vote is rooted in a rationale that will “more likely than not” 
increase the economic value of the plan.
45
 “The mere fact that plans are shareholders in the 
corporations in which they invest does not itself provide a rationale for a fiduciary to spend plan 
assets to pursue, support or oppose such proxy proposals.”46 The DoL further said that any use of 
pension-plan assets must have a connection to furthering economic value to ensure that such 
assets are not solely being used to further political issues.
47
  
2. INITIATIVES BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:  
a) Rule 275.206(4)–6: Establishing an Investment Adviser’s Duty to Consider “Best 
Interest” When Voting Proxies 
 
                                                          
44
 Id.  [Emphasis added]. 
45
 Id. at 61734. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
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In 2003, the SEC adopted a rule pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(“Advisers Act”).48 §275.206(4)–6 establishes that investment advisers registered under the 
Advisers Act are required to: 
(a)[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to 
ensure that [it] vote[s] client securities in the best interest of clients, which procedures 
must include how [it] address[es] conflicts that may arise between [its] interests and those 
of [its] clients; 
(b) disclose to clients how [it] may obtain information from [it] about how [it] voted with 
respect to their securities; and  
(c) describe to clients [its] proxy-voting policies and procedures and, upon request, 
furnish copy of the policies and procedures to the requesting client.
49
 
 
The Advisers Act generally defines an "investment adviser" as  
 
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either 
directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation 
and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning 
securities.
50
 
 
This rule is of importance because the management of mutual funds and pension-plan 
assets is often delegated to an investment adviser who is subject to the Investment Advisers 
Act.
51
 There are certain criteria surrounding registering under the Investment Advisers Act. For 
example, pension-plan consultants who give advice to ERISA plans that manage more than 
$200,000,000 million in assets must register under the Advisers Act.
52
 Further, those (which may 
include advisers to non-ERISA plans) who have assets under management of more than 
$100,000,000 may register under the Advisers Act, but those who manage $110,000,000 or more 
in assets must register under the Advisers Act.
53
  
                                                          
48
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: PROXY VOTING BY INVESTMENT ADVISERS, Release 
No. 1A-2106 (2003), available at, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm#llA2a [hereinafter “Proxy Rule 
Release”]. 
49
 17 C.F.R §275.206(4)-6 (West 2017). [Emphasis added]. 
50
 15 U.S.C § 8ob-2(a)(11) (West 2017). 
51
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO 
FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 6 (2007), available at, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/263233.pdf [hereinafter “GOA 2007”]. 
52
 17 C.F.R.A §275.203A-2(a)(1) and (2) (Lexis 2017). 
53
 17 C.F.R.A §275.203A-1(a)(1) (Lexis 2017). 
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In effect, §275.206(4)–6 serves as the SEC’s “Avon Letter,” largely setting forth that 
investment advisers under the Advisers Act must conduct a best-interest analysis as they vote 
proxies, while also maintaining disclosure regarding information on voting methods and general 
policies and procedures. While the SEC set forth this explanation of investment advisers’ duties 
pursuant to the Advisers Act, it also noted that it was not setting forth that an adviser who failed 
to vote every proxy would be in violation of their duties; rather, the SEC noted that there may be 
times when refraining from voting would be in the best interest of the client, like when voting, 
for example, would out-cost any benefit to the client.
54
 This is very similar to what the DoL did 
in its 2008 interpretive bulletin. Effectively, both agencies have communicated that while 
fiduciaries are to vote in the best interest of the clients/beneficiaries, they are not required to vote 
all proxies when doing so would go against a rational cost-benefit analysis. 
b) SEC Sends No-Action Letter to Egan-Jones: The Link Between Utilizing Proxy Firms and 
Fulfilling What is in the “Best Interest” of Clients; SEC’s Letter to ISS: Adding to the 
Egan-Jones Letter 
 
On March 27, 2004, in a letter to proxy-advisory firm Egan-Jones, the Commission 
established that investment advisers registered under the Advisers Act could, to ensure that they 
are in compliance with Rule 275.206(4)–6, vote proxies based on pre-determined policy rooted 
in recommendations from independent third parties.
55
 Turning to the recommendations of third 
parties would, effectively, show that the adviser’s actions were not a “product of conflict of 
interest.”56 The Commission also noted, however, that, if concerned about conflicts, an adviser 
                                                          
54
 Proxy Rule Release, supra, n. 48. 
55
 Egan-Jones Letter, supra, n. 26. 
56
 Id.  
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could adopt and implement a policy of disclosing to its clients the conflict of interest and obtain 
its clients’ consent before voting the proxy.57  
This letter created the gateway between institutional-shareholder organizations and 
proxy-advisory firms because investment advisers for institutional investors have turned to proxy 
advisory firms as the “independent third party” that the Commission alluded to in its letter to 
Egan-Jones.
58
  Thus, the phenomenon that resulted from the Commission’s interpretation was 
that institutional investors were enabled to shift their duties to a third party – e.g. a proxy-
advisory firm.
59
 When investment advisers turn to proxy-advisory firms, institutional 
shareholders’ assets (e.g. their votes) are metaphorically passing through another party’s hands, 
and, with that, another potential layer of separation is created.  
Leo Strine Jr., Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, captured the relationship 
between institutional shareholders and proxy-advisory firms best when he said the following, 
Many institutional investors have, as I mentioned, little desire to do any thinking of their 
own, particularly about investments that they often hold for nanoseconds.
 
Into this 
opportunistic breach has stepped an organization called Institutional Shareholders 
Services (ISS), which provides institutions with recommendations as to how to vote on 
corporate governance issues. Following ISS constitutes a form of insurance against 
regulatory criticism, and results in ISS having a large sway in the affairs of American 
corporations. Moreover, powerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland, 
where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views about 
issues like proposed mergers, executive compensation, and poison pills. They do so 
because the CEOs recognize that some institutional investors will simply follow ISS's 
advice rather than do any thinking of their own. ISS has been so successful that it now 
has a California rival, Glass Lewis.
60
 
 
                                                          
57
 Id. at n. 5 (citing U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: PROXY VOTING BY INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS, RELEASE NO. IA-2106, RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, available at, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm#llA2a)  
58
 See JAMES GLASSMAN & J.W. VERRET, MERCATUS CTR. GEORGE MASON UNIV., HOW TO FIX OUR BROKEN 
PROXY SYSTEM, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, 9-10 (2013), available at, 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Glassman_ProxyAdvisorySystem_04152013.pdf 
59
 Id. at 26.  
60
 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and 
Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005). [Emphasis added]. 
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It is worth noting that although the Commission encouraged the use of an independent 
third party in its Egan-Jones letter, it did also set boundaries to an investment adviser’s “handing 
off of duties” to said third parties. For example, in that same letter, the Commission also set forth 
that investment advisers had an obligation to ensure that the proxy firm being utilized “(a) has 
the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues and (b) can make such 
recommendations in an impartial manner in the best interest of the adviser’s clients.”61  
The Commission also sent a response letter to ISS in 2004, establishing that investment 
advisers should obtain information from prospective proxy-voting firms to ensure that the firms 
that they are obtaining recommendations from are, in fact, independent.
62
 This may entail “a case 
by case evaluation of the proxy voting firm's relationships with Issuers, a thorough review of the 
proxy voting firm's conflict procedures and the effectiveness of their implementation, and/or 
other means reasonably designed to ensure the integrity of the proxy voting process.”63 Thus, this 
letter set forth that investment advisers cannot simply “blindly” follow the recommendations of 
proxy-advisory firms without making sure that the firm is not giving said information for self-
interested purposes.  
Since the Egan-Jones and ISS letters, the Commission’s two seminal actions were in 
2010 and 2013. In 2010, the Commission released its Concept Release, which solicited 
comments about the possibility of regulating the proxy-advisory industry.
64
 In 2013, the SEC 
conducted a roundtable to discuss the relationship between institutional-shareholder 
                                                          
61
 Egan-Jones Letter, supra, n. 26. 
62
 Letter from Douglas Schiedt, Associate Director and Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, to Mari Anne Pisarri on behalf of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. 
(September 15, 2004), archived at, http://perma.cc/Q8YH-SAXR. [hereinafter “ISS Letter”]. 
63
 Id. 
64
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CONCEPT RELEASE ON THE U.S. PROXY SYSTEM, Release Nos. 34-
62495 (July 14, 2010), archived at, https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495.pdf  
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organizations and the proxy-advisory industry.
65
 Of importance at this roundtable were the 
statements made by former Commission Chair Harvey Pitt. At the 2013 roundtable, former 
Chairman Pitt confirmed that the two no-action letters (sent to Egan-Jones and ISS), in effect, 
extended §275-206(4)–6; and, the result (albeit also based on other factors) was to “encourage 
portfolio managers … to use proxy firms.”66 
c) 2014 SEC Staff Legal Bulletin Number 20: Reiterating that Investment Advisers Must 
Oversee Proxy-Advisory Firms They Retain 
 
In June of 2014, the Commission issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (“Legal Bulleting 
No. 20”).67 In this Bulletin, the Commission said that if an investment adviser were to retain a 
proxy-advisory firm, it should “adopt and implement policies and procedures that are reasonably 
designed to provide sufficient ongoing oversight of the third party in order to ensure that the 
investment adviser, acting through the third party (the proxy firm), continues to vote proxies in 
the best interest of its clients.”68 Thus, Legal Bulletin No. 20 reiterates, as did the Egan-Jones 
and ISS letters, that investment advisers to institutional shareholders cannot simply delegate their 
duties without some level of oversight. Legal Bulletin No. 20 also reiterated another sentiment 
that has been echoed by both the DoL and the SEC in the past: Investment advisers (fiduciaries) 
can limit the amount of proxies they are obligated to vote.
69
 For example, the Commission set 
forth that “an investment adviser and its client could agree that the investment adviser will focus 
resources on only particular types of proposals based on the client’s preferences.”70 
                                                          
65
 See generally U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, TRANSCRIPT OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ 
ROUNDTABLE (December 5, 2013), archived at, http://perma.cc/Z57U-QNGW 
66
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, TRANSCRIPT OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROUNDTABLE, p. 0026, 
lines 1-25; p. 0027, lines 1-3 (December 5, 2013), archived at, http://perma.cc/Z57U-QNGW 
67
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN NO. 20 (June 20, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L7KN-MD8R   
68
 Id.   
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. 
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3. INITIATIVES THROUGH NON-AGENCY LEGISLATIVE ACTION:  
a) The Dodd-Frank Act and the Say on Pay Provision: Another Factor Contributing to the 
Increase in Proxy Voting, and, in Turn, the Influence of Proxy-Advisory Firms 
 
In July of 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank Act”) was enacted.71 Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that public companies 
conduct non-binding shareholder votes on executive pay at least once every three years.
72
 This 
requirement has become known as the “say on pay” (“SoP”) vote.73 The trend has been that 
companies are holding these votes annually, rather than biennially or triennially (as is 
permitted).
74
 Thus, there was an anticipated substantial increase in expected votes (or, at least, 
the matters being voted on).
75
 With that, there has also been an anticipated increased in 
institutional investors’ dependence on proxy firms, as well.76 “Although institutional investors 
may have custom proxy voting policies [regarding executive pay], the basis for many, if not 
most, of these policies is the advisory firm’s base policies.”77 Thus, the advent of the Dodd-
Frank Act only solidified the built-upon relationship between institutional-shareholder 
organizations and proxy firms. 
The different governmental initiatives mentioned above attempted to create more 
accountability for investment advisers (plan fiduciaries); the effect, however, of many of the 
                                                          
71
 12 USC § 5301, et seq. (Pub.L. 111–203) 
72
 15 USC § 78n–1 
73
 Id. 
74
 Charles M. Nathan, Proxy Advisory Business: Apotheosis or Apogee?, THE HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOV. AND FIN. REG. (March 23, 2011), available at, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/03/23/proxy-advisory-
business-apotheosis-or-apogee/  
75
 Center on Executive Compensation, supra, n. 31 at 4. 
76
 Id.  
77
 Id. (Former TIAA-CREF General Counsel and current Governance for Owners U.S. CEO, Peter Clapman, 
indicated that “the inevitable consequence [of adopting say on pay] would be to transfer considerable discretionary 
power over individual company compensation practices to the proxy advisory firms. I question that such an 
approach will serve the long-term best interests of shareholders”) (Columbia Law Professor Jeffrey Gordon, 
indicated that “the burden of annual voting would lead investors, particularly institutional investors, to farm out 
evaluation of most pay plans to a handful of proxy advisory firms who themselves will seek to economize on proxy 
review costs”). 
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aforementioned initiatives proved to be a siphoning of duties to proxy-advisory firms under the 
guise that the initial plan managers of a plan would still “monitor” these proxy firms. Part II of 
this paper will explain why this siphoning of duties can be problematic.  
PART II 
ISS AND GLASS LEWIS:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THESE TWO FIRMS’ PRESENCE 
IN THE MARKET  
  
ISS was founded in 1985 by Robert A.G. Monks, a former administrator at the DoL.
78
 Monks 
served as the CEO of ISS from 1985-1990.
79
 Today, ISS is the largest proxy-advisory firm in the 
industry. It covers over 117 markets, has over 1,700 institutional clients and executes about 8.5 
million proxy votes annually.
80
 In 2014, ISS was acquired by Vestar Capital Partners VI, L.P. 
(“Vestar”) for $364 million.81 Two board members at ISS carry executive positions at Vestar. 
Kenneth O’Keefe serves as a board member to ISS and is also the Chief Operating Officer at 
Vestar.
82
 Robert Rosner serves as a board member to ISS and is also the Co-President of 
Vestar.
83
  
ISS has been criticized as being entrenched in conflict.
84
 One of the main rationales for this 
criticism is rooted in the way that ISS operates. While ISS offers advice to institutional 
shareholders (primarily, to investment advisers) on how they should vote on proxies, it also, 
according to its website, offers corporate-governance consulting services to clients who may be 
                                                          
78
 Id. at 28. 
79
 Id. 
80
 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, https://www.issgovernance.com/about/about-iss/ (last visited March 
3, 2017). 
81
 See VESTAR CAPITAL PARTNERS VI, LLP, http://www.vestarcapital.com/vestar-capital-partners-to-acquire-
institutional-shareholder-services-from-msci/ (last visited March 3, 2017).  
82
 See BLOOMBERG PROFILES (INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/77449Z:US-institutional-shareholder-services-inc (last visited 
March 3, 2017) and BLOOMBERG PROFILES (VESTAR CAPITAL PARTNERS VI, LLP) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/22100Z:US-vestar-capital-partners-inc (last visited March 3, 2017). 
83
 Id. 
84
 Center on Executive Compensation, supra, n.31 at 7-9. 
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issuers of securities.
85
 Thus, ISS, in effect, could be offering services to a public company while 
also advising an institutional shareholder on how to vote on that very same company’s proxy.  
This conflict was aptly captured in a statement made by compensation analyst Graef Crystal, 
who said, “they’ve got a severe conflict when they work both sides of the street. It’s like the 
Middle Ages when the Pope was selling indulgences. ISS is selling advice to corporations on 
how to avoid getting on their list of bad companies.”86 As such, some industry professionals note 
that certain companies may feel obligated to utilize ISS’s consulting services as a way to ensure 
that they receive favorable voting on their proxies.
87
  
To mitigate concerns regarding conflict, ISS has adopted a policy of disclosure. According to 
its website, ISS has set forth that it will disclose “significant relationships” that it has with 
certain public issuers.
88
 A paying issuer who purchases services from its subsidiary, ISS 
Corporate Solutions, Inc. (its corporate governance-consulting company), is to be considered a 
“significant relationship” per its policy.89 It also views public-issuer clients that contribute to five 
percent or more of ISS’s total, consolidated revenue for the fiscal year through purchasing its 
proxy-service products as a “significant relationship” to be disclosed.90 Thus, substantial 
disclosure is provided by ISS to institutional-shareholder organizations’ advisers – albeit public-
issuer clients who do not contribute to five percent or more of ISS’s total consolidated revenue 
for purchases of proxy-service products will not be disclosed. 
                                                          
85
 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, https://www.isscorporatesolutions.com/ (last visited March 3, 
2017). 
86
  Leslie Wayne, Have Shareholder Activists Lost Their Edge?, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, at C7, archived at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/30/business/have-shareholder-activists-lost-their-edge.html?pagewanted=2  
87
 GOA 2007, supra, n. 51 at 10 (2007). 
88
 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, DUE DILIGENCE POLICY, available at, 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/duediligence/significant-relationships-disclosure.pdf (effective 2014).  
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. 
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Glass Lewis is the second-largest firm in the proxy-advisory industry, and its corporate 
structure also has deep-rooted possibilities for conflict.  Glass Lewis was founded in 2003.
91
 It 
has over 1,200 clients and more than 360 employees worldwide.
92
 Glass Lewis is a subsidiary of 
the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (“OTPP”) and the Alberta Investment Management Corp. 
(“AIMCo”).93 Glass Lewis is a company registered in Delaware, and the OTPP owns 80 percent 
of the company while AIMCo owns 20 percent.
94
  
As highlighted in the opening of this paper, the OTPP is a highly-active institutional-
investment organization that has shares in many public companies – public companies which 
other institutional shareholders may have ownership in and vote proxies for. Thus, herein lies 
Glass Lewis’ conflict: If Glass Lewis’ parent company is the OTPP, it may be inclined to advise 
other institutional shareholders to vote the proxies that OTPP has an ownership interest in in a 
manner that is most beneficial to OTPP (and its specific agenda), which may be adverse to the 
interests of the institutional shareholder.
95
 To see the OTPP’s active investment practices one 
only need look to its website; for example, the OTPP has even established that it factors in 
                                                          
91
 Center on Executive Compensation, supra, n. 31 at 33. 
92
 See GLASS LEWIS, http://www.glasslewis.com/company-overview/ (last visited March 3, 2017). 
93
 Id.  
94
 See GLASS LEWIS, COMPANY PROFILE ON LEXISNEXIS (last updated as of March 6, 2017), 
https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=742bcff3-3021-497f-b8cf-
9954c5ed46f7&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcompanyfinancial%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5DVB
-4W31-JC4V-R0K4-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5DVB-4W31-JC4V-R0K4-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=149023&pdteaserkey=sr2&ecomp=r89tk&earg=sr2&prid=0c6d146f-6afd-407d-a814-
d5aa83b8038a; See also GLASS LEWIS & CO., LLC, available at, http://www.glasslewis.com/aimco-acquires-20-
ownership-stake-in-glass-lewis-from-ontario-teachers/ (last visited April 9, 2017). 
95
 William Holstein, The Ownership of Glass Lewis is All Wrong, CBS MONEY WATCH, (last updated November 6, 
2007, 2:12 p.m.), available at, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-ownership-of-glass-lewis-is-all-wrong/ (“It's hard 
to believe, however, that there will be no connection between the two entities. Teachers', with about $100 billion in 
assets, invests in stocks of companies around the world as well as other financial instruments. Earlier this year, it 
lead a private equity group that bought Montreal-based communications giant BCE Inc., the biggest corporate 
takeover in Canadian history. So how is Glass Lewis going to evaluate the corporate governance practices of BCE? 
Indeed, how would it rate the practices of any company where Teachers' has a major investment? And what if 
Teachers' wants to take over another company? What will the Glass Lewis recommendation be to shareholders? No, 
it just doesn't wash”). 
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environmental, social and governance factors into its investment decisions
96
; thus, Glass Lewis 
may be inclined to steer their proxy-voting advice to institutional investors in a direction that 
aligns with the OTPP’s views on environmental, social or governance matters – even though this 
direction may not be most beneficial to the institutional investor.  
Glass Lewis’s members have a duty under Delaware law – since it is an organized under 
Delaware – to carry out its business in a manner that is in the best interest of its parent 
companies 
97
 (which, in its current structure, would be the entities that hold a stake in Glass 
Lewis). Thus, to carry out its duty to its respective parent companies, Glass Lewis might have to 
give advice that would compromise the interest of other institutional shareholders if that interest 
is opposite to that of the OTPP. 
Glass Lewis, like ISS, has attempted to mitigate its potentially conflicted image. On its 
website, Glass Lewis includes a Conflict of Interest Statement. In this statement, the firm vows 
that “neither OTPP nor AIMCo is involved in the day-to-day management of Glass Lewis’ 
business” and “when OTPP or AIMCo has a reportable stake in a corporate issuer, Glass Lewis 
discloses the conflict on the cover of the relevant research report.
98
 Glass Lewis also implements 
a Research Advisory Council, which is an independent external group of industry experts that are 
charged with ensuring the comprehensiveness of Glass Lewis’s proxy policies.99 In addition to 
these measures, Glass Lewis also states that it  
                                                          
96
 See ONTARIO TEACHERS’ PENSION PLAN, https://www.otpp.com/investments/responsible-investing/our-
principled-approach (last visited March 3, 2017).  
97
 See William Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 756 (Del. 2011) (finding LLC managers breached duty of loyalty 
by entering into self-interested and unfair sale of company); Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern 
Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1173 (1988) (The Adadarko opinion sets forth that the directors of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary owes a duty to its parent company to manage the business in the best interest of the parent company; 
while Glass Lewis is not wholly owned by the OTPP, it is majority-owned by the OTPP, and, thus, the court could 
extend Anadarko to find that Glass Lewis does owe a duty, at the very least, to OTPP and AIMCo).  
98
 See GLASS LEWIS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST STATEMENT, http://www.glasslewis.com/conflict-of-interest/ (last 
visited March 3, 2017).  
99
 Id. 
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maintains conflict management procedures to mitigate potential conflicts when: (i) an issuer 
contacts Glass Lewis directly with a request to purchase a copy of its report; (ii) an employee 
or a relative of an employee of Glass Lewis or any of its subsidiaries, a member of the RAC, 
or a member of Glass Lewis’ Strategic Committee, whose members include Glass Lewis 
owner representatives and former employees, serves as an executive or director of a public 
company; (iii) an institutional investor customer of Glass Lewis is a public company or is 
affiliated in some way to an issuer (e.g. division, branch, subsidiary, etc.); (iv) a Glass Lewis 
customer submits a shareholder proposal, is a dissident shareholder in a proxy contest, or is 
otherwise publicly soliciting shareholder support for or against a director or proposal.
100
 
 
While both firms affirm that they will disclose conflicts, this disclosure does not necessarily 
mean that the root relationship of the conflict is not embedded in the work that either of these 
firms conducts. Outside of conflict, these firms’ work has also been criticized for being 
inadequate.
101
  
Some critics have pointed out that it is simply impractical to assume that ISS and/or Glass 
Lewis could handle the sheer amount of voting recommendations that are required in such a 
concentrated time frame.
102
 For example, in 2009, “ISS issued proxy research and voting 
recommendations for more than 37,000 companies … and Glass Lewis provided similar services 
for more than 16,000 companies around the world.”103 Most companies hold shareholder 
meetings between March and June, meaning that most of the proxy-advisory work would be 
limited to a four-month time span, which imposes an “extraordinary seasonal burden on the 
proxy advisors.”104  Furthermore, with the SoP-vote requirement, thousands of annual proxy 
issues are added that would require research – being that many SoP votes are (as mentioned 
earlier in this paper) conducted annually, rather than biennially or triennially.
105
 Thus, based on a 
bare analysis of practicality, it would be a stretch to set forth that proxy firms’ recommendations 
                                                          
100
 Id. 
101
 Center on Executive Compensation, supra, n. 31 at 58-59. 
102
 Nathan, supra, n. 74.  
103
 Id. 
104
 Id. 
105
 Id. 
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can or will be based on an in-depth analysis. Rather, proxy firms have a reputation of applying a 
“one-size-fits-all” policy that is simplistic in its nature.106 
Furthermore, there is a showing that some proxy-firm policies are rooted in a rationale that 
actually goes against principles that have been shown to add value to plans. For example, ISS has 
indicated in the past that it would support, “on a case-by-case basis, proposals that give 
shareholders the right to nominate director candidates to the corporate proxy, despite evidence 
suggesting that proxy access generally fails to add value.”107 And, ISS has opposed golden 
parachutes when such a business practice has actually been tied to an increase in share prices.
108
  
The Center on Executive Compensation (“CEC”) and the HR Policy Association (“HRP”) 
also conducted member surveys in 2010 that revealed many inaccuracies in proxy advisory 
methods.
109
 For example, 53 percent of the members that responded to the survey said that “a 
proxy advisory firm had made one or more mistakes in a final published report on the company’s 
compensation program.”110 Fifty-seven percent of survey respondents said that “a proxy-
advisory firm had used a compensation peer group in a preliminary draft of a report that failed to 
take into account the company’s size, industry, complexity or compensation for talent.”111 The 
CEC and HRP also noted that various factors found in the models that proxy-advisory firms set 
forth are not made public under the notion that they are considered proprietary.
112
 Thus, this 
promotes a lack of transparency. 
                                                          
106
 Id. 
107
 Glassman, supra, n. 58 at 15(citing Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage 
Share Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 Stanford L.R. 1431, 1431-68 (2010)). 
108
 Id. (citing generally Richard A Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision Making and 
Shareholder Wealth, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECON. 7 (1985)). 
109
 Center on Executive Compensation, supra, n. 31 at 58.  
110
 Id. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Id. at 60. 
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Based on the above analysis of the functioning, structure and policy adoptions of the two 
largest proxy-advisory firms, it is evident that there is such a limited chance that retaining them 
for advice can be in the “best interest” of an institutional shareholders’ clients. As mentioned, the 
mere disclosure of conflicts does not mean that they do not exist – or continue to influence the 
decisions made by these proxy-advisory firms. Furthermore, the arguably arbitrary nature and 
one-size-fits all approach to proxy policies that likely have been adopted by these firms 
undercuts the probability that these firms’ input regarding proxies could be in the best interest of 
an institutional shareholder’s plan. What these firms have are inherent flaws in their structure, 
method and application that are highly susceptible to lead to conflict. 
PART III 
HOW VARIOUS PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FAIL TO ADDRESS ROOT CAUSE OF THE 
FLAWS OF THE PROXY-ADVISORY INDUSTRY 
 
 The solutions captured in Part III are all attempts to address the issues of the proxy-
advisory industry mentioned in Part II. They all fail, however, to address the inherent structural 
flaws of the industry, as well as the fact that investment advisers (many of whom are ERISA-
plan fiduciaries, as well) are already tasked with ensuring that their clients/beneficiaries are 
shielded from the inherent flaws of industries like the proxy industry. 
1. MODELING REGULATIONS FOR THE PROXY-ADVISORY INDUSTRY AFTER THOSE THAT HAVE 
BEEN APPLIED TO THE CREDIT-RATING-AGENCY INDUSTRY: 
 
The proxy-advisory industry has been held to be analogous to the credit-rating agencies for 
multiple reasons:
113
 (1) both synthesize information to single ratings
114
; (2) the information that 
these entities release only represents their view of the industry they are rating/assessing
115
; (3) 
                                                          
113
 Belinfanti, supra, n.12 at 431. 
114
 Id. 
115
 Id. at 432. 
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there are small numbers of firms that dominate the industry as a whole
116
; and (4) both entities’ 
approaches and/or methodologies have been criticized as being inaccurate
117
. 
Section 2 of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 sets forth requirements that an 
organization must comply with to be considered a “nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization.
118” To obtain such recognition, agencies must submit an application to the SEC 
with the following information:  
(1) credit ratings performance measurement statistics over short-term, mid-term, and long-
term periods; (2) the procedures and methodologies that the applicant uses in determining 
credit ratings; (3) policies or procedures adopted and implemented by the applicant to 
prevent the misuse of material, nonpublic information; (4) its organizational structure; (5) 
whether it has in effect a code of ethics, and, if not, why; (6) any conflict of interest relating 
to its issuance of credit ratings; (7) on a confidential basis, a list of the twenty largest issuers 
and subscribers that use its credit ratings services by amount of net revenues received in the 
fiscal year immediately preceding the date of submission of the application; and (8) any other 
information and documents which the SEC may by rule prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection for investors.
119
 
 
 What this solution fails to address as applied to the proxy-advisory industry is that proxy 
firms already disclose much of this information. As mentioned above, ISS and Glass Lewis make 
their organizational structures available; they publish their code of ethics, and they disclose 
conflicts of interest to investment advisers (or ERISA-plan fiduciaries).
120
 It is true that this 
information does not need to be disclosed to or filed with the SEC if the proxy firm does not fall 
under the Advisers Act. However, as already established, much of this information has been 
disclosed to the investment advisers that are captured under the Advisers Act (and/or fall under 
ERISA).  
                                                          
116
 Id. 
117
 Id. 
118
 (Name redacted) CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND THEIR REGULATION 4 
(2010), available at, 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20100409_R40613_1d61ef51013055a61bda270b2259e640a92c797f.pdf; See 
also P.L. 109-291. 
119
 Id. 
120
 Infra, Part II. 
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Investment advisers registered under the Adviser Act are under the purview of the SEC. In 
fact, pursuant to the 2004 Egan-Jones and ISS letters, the SEC has already established that 
investment advisers have a duty to ensure that proxy-advisory firms are performing adequately 
and that they can make a decision in an impartial manner.
121
 In fact, to reiterate, in its letter to 
ISS, the Commission also noted that an investment adviser must, to carry out his or her duty, 
conduct a “case by case evaluation of the proxy voting firm's relationships with Issuers, a 
thorough review of the proxy voting firm's conflict procedures and the effectiveness of their 
implementation, and/or other means reasonably designed to ensure the integrity of the proxy 
voting process.”122 [Emphasis added]. Thus, the Commission has already said that the investment 
advisor must test the truth of the disclosure of the proxy firm by assessing the “effectiveness” of 
the firm’s conflict procedures. 
2. CREATION OF AN OVERSIGHT BOARD FOR PROXY-ADVISORY FIRMS: 
Another proposed solution has been to create an oversight board that is similar to the Public 
Company Oversight Accounting Board (“PCOAB”).123 Features of a proxy-advisory oversight 
board would include the following factors that are a part of the PCOAB: “(i) the creation of 
auditing and ethics standards; (ii) the authority to conduct a continuing program of inspections; 
(iii) a requirement that audit firms register with the PCOAB; and (iv) the grant of enforcement 
action to the PCAOB to investigate and discipline registered public accounting firms.”124 
                                                          
121
 See Letter from Douglas Schiedt, Associate Director and Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to Kent S. Hughes, Managing Director, Egan-Jones Proxy Services 
(May 27, 2004), archived at, http://perma.cc/KSJ2-JP5N; See also Letter from Douglas Schiedt, Associate Director 
and Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to Mari Anne 
Pisarri on behalf of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (September 15, 2004), archived at, 
http://perma.cc/Q8YH-SAXR. [Hereinafter “Egan-Jones Letter”] 
122
 ISS Letter, supra, n. 62. 
123
 Belinfanti, supra, n. 12 at 436-37. 
124
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While a proposed oversight board for proxy-advisory firms could implement uniformity 
among the proxy-advisory industry by promoting uniform auditing and ethics standards, this 
solution also fails to acknowledge that the ultimate entity conducting “oversight” between proxy-
advisory firms and institutional shareholders is supposed to be the investment advisers (or 
ERISA-plan fiduciaries) charged with ensuring that proxies are voted in the “best interest” of 
their clients.
125
 Furthermore, one need not conduct an in-depth analysis to find that certain proxy 
industries may be inherently conflicted despite the disclosures they offer.  
For example, if Glass Lewis has a duty to perform in the best interest of its 
members/investors (e.g. its parent companies), and the carrying out of such a duty could, in turn, 
hinder the institutional shareholder because its members’ interest are adverse to the interests of 
the shareholders, the onus should be on an investment adviser to ensure that utilizing Glass 
Lewis’s services is, in fact, going to aid in enhancing the economic value of its client’s plan 
through proxy voting. As stated in the previous section, this is already the expectation that the 
SEC has of investment advisers.
126
 
3. MANDATORY REGISTRATION UNDER THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940: 
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, an investment adviser (as mentioned earlier in 
this paper) is an individual who, “for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . 
. as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
securities, or . . . issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.’”127 The SEC 
has said that proxy firms fall under the definition of investment adviser and, as such, have duties 
to their advisory clients, but that does not mean they necessary have to register under the 
                                                          
125
 See 17 C.F.R § 275.206(4)–6; see also Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Secretary, U. S. Department of 
Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retirement Board, Avon Products, Inc., (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 ERISA 
LEXIS 19. 
126
 Egan-Jones Letter, supra, n. 26; ISS Letter, supra, n. 62. 
127
 See 15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(11) (2017). 
King Scholar Seminar 
Spring 2017 
 
29 
 
Advisers Act.
128
 Registration imposes several additional duties on those who fall under the 
Advisers Act. These include “disclosure of arrangements that may lead to conflicts of interest 
with their clients,
129
 implementation and annual review of internal compliance programs 
designed to ensure compliance with the Advisers Act,
130
 designation of a chief compliance 
officer to oversee the compliance program,
131
and the creation and preservation of records to be 
inspected by an SEC examiner.”132 Although all proxy firms are not required to register under 
the Advisers Act, all firms are subject to Section 206 of the Advisers Act – known as the anti-
fraud provision – meaning that proxy firms cannot “employ and device, scheme or artifice to 
defraud any client or prospective client.”133 
As of December 8, 2016, ISS confirmed that it is, in fact, a registered investment adviser 
pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
134
 In fact, by 2016, ISS had been a federally 
                                                          
128
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CONCEPT RELEASE ON THE U.S. PROXY SYSTEM, RELEASE NOS. 
34-62495, 43010 (July 22, 2010), archived at, https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495fr.pdf; see also  17 
C.F.R.A §275.203A-2(a)(1) and (2) (Lexis 2017) (plan consultants who give advice to ERISA plans that manage 
more than $200,000,000 million in assets must register under the Advisers Act); see also 17 C.F.R.A §275.203A-
1(a)(1) (Lexis 2017) (those (which may include advisers to non-ERISA plans) who have assets under management 
of more than $100,000,000 may register under the Advisers Act, but those who manage $110,000,000 or more in 
assets must register under the Advisers Act).  
129
 Edelman, supra, n. 36 at 1381 (citing U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CONCEPT RELEASE ON THE 
U.S. PROXY SYSTEM, RELEASE NOS. 34-62495 113-14 (July 14, 2010), archived at, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495.pdf (Part II of Form ADV, or a brochure containing the 
information in the Form, is required to be delivered to advisory clients or prospective clients by Rule 204-3 under 
the Advisers Act [17 C.F.R. §275.204-3]. In addition to the disclosure of certain conflicts of interest, Part II contains 
information including the adviser's fee schedule and the educational and business background of management and 
key advisory personnel of the adviser. Part II is currently not submitted to the SEC but must be kept by advisers in 
their files and made available to the SEC upon request and is ‘considered filed.”’)); see also U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm and 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm (refer to the “Brochure Rule” and “Books and 
Records to be Retained”). 
130
 Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-7(a) to (b) (2017)). 
131
 Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-7(c) (2017)). 
132
 Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. §275.204-2 (2017)). 
133
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CONCEPT RELEASE ON THE U.S. PROXY SYSTEM, RELEASE NOS. 
34-62495, 43010 (July 22, 2010), archived at, https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495fr.pdf (this SEC 
Concept Release also sets forth that proxy firms are prohibited from making false or misleading statements under 
Exchange Act Rule 14a–9). 
134
 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, STATEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES INC. TO THE 
SEC INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, File No. 265-28, 5 (2016), available at, 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/265-28/26528-271.pdf  
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registered investment adviser under the Advisers Act for about 20 years.
135
 Thus, ISS is already 
required to follow many of the registration duties that are required by the Investment Advisers 
Act – and has been subject to these requirements for a lengthy time. Glass Lewis is not registered 
under the Investment Advisers Act.
136
 However, non-registration is not common-place in the 
proxy-advisory industry. Marco Consulting and ProxyVote (two other proxy firms) are registered 
as investment advisers.
137
 And while Egan-Jones (again, another proxy firm) is not registered 
under the Advisers Act, it is registered as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization, meaning that it is required to meet standards tied to its credit-rating activity – 
albeit these requirements do not encompass its proxy-advisory services.
138
 
The fact that the majority (particularly, the largest) of proxy-advisory firms are already 
registered under the Investment Advisers Act
139
 shows that registration is not going to fix the 
issues of the proxy industry – after all, there are continuous concerns despite most of the firms 
being registered. Furthermore, as of 2007, the SEC noted that it had not pursued enforcement 
action against any of the proxy firms registered under the Advisers Act.
140
  
In 2009, however, the SEC did settle its first case, and it was against INTECH, an investment 
adviser who had followed ISS’s proxy recommendation to follow The American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (“AFL-CIO”) voting recommendations.141 The 
SEC found that INTECH violated Rule 275.206(4)–6 because it failed to maintain written 
                                                          
135
 Id. see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-47 CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS PROXY 
ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 9 (2016), available at, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681050.pdf; see also George W. Dent Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1287, 1311 (2015). 
136
 GOA 2016, supra, n. 27 at 9 (2016). 
137
 Id. 
138
 Id. 
139
 As noted in the previous paragraph, ISS, Macro Consulting and ProxyVote are all registered under the 
Investment Advisers Act. 
140
 GOA 2007, supra, n. 51 at 12. 
141
 Center on Executive Compensation, supra, n. 31 at 64 (citing Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, SEC Enforcement 
Action Focuses on Investment Adviser’s Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures (2009)).  
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policies and procedures addressing conflicts that arose between INTECH’s interests and its 
clients that were not pro-AFL-CIO.
142
  This action by the SEC reflects, as do the Egan-Jones and 
ISS letters, an emphasis on the duties of the investment adviser to ensure that their client’s best 
interest is met when a proxy firm is utilized – granted that the emphasis was on written-policy 
maintenance as opposed to an actual assessment of best interest. 
4. PROPOSED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM AND TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2016, H.R. 5311: 
On May 24, 2016, bill H.R. 5311 was introduced to Congress by Representative Sean 
Duffy.
143
 This bill, which was referred to as the Corporate Governance Reform and 
Transparency Act of 2016, would have amended Section 3(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C § 78c(a)).
144
 The bill did not make it out of committee and has yet to be re-
introduced to Congress. The bill, however, captured various aspects of many of the proposed 
regulatory fixes for the proxy-advisory industry mentioned above.  
For example, Section 15H (b)(1)(A) of the bill would have required all proxy-advisory firms 
to register with the Commission.
145
 Under Sec. 15H(b)(1)(B), for a proxy firm to register, it 
would have to submit the following on an application to the Commission:  
(i) a certification that the applicant has adequate financial and managerial resources to 
consistently provide proxy advice based on accurate information; (ii) the procedures and 
methodologies that the applicant uses in developing proxy voting recommendations, 
including whether and how the applicant considers the size of a company when making 
proxy voting recommendations; (iii) the organizational structure of the applicant; (iv) 
whether or not applicant has in effect a code of ethics, and if not, the reasons therefor; (v) any 
potential or actual conflict of interest relating to the ownership structure of the applicant or 
the provision of proxy advisory services by the applicant, including whether the proxy 
advisory firm engages in services ancillary to the provision of proxy advisory services such 
as consulting services for corporate issuers, and if so the revenues derived therefrom; (vi) the 
policies and procedure in place to manage conflicts of interest under subsection (f); and (vii) 
any other information and documents concerning the applicant and any person associated 
                                                          
142
 Id. 
143
 H.R. 5311, 114
th
 Cong. (2016), available at, https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr5311/BILLS-114hr5311rh.pdf  
144
 Id. Sec. 2(a). 
145
 Id. Sec. (b)(1)(A). 
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with such applicant as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
146
 
 
 Sec. 15H(b)(3) of H.R. 5311 would have required that all of the information submitted by 
a proxy firm on its application to the Commission pursuant to the Act be disclosed to the public 
through the Commission’s website. Sec. 15H(g)(1) of H.R. 5311 would have also required that 
proxy-advisory firms appoint an ombudsman to receive complaints from the subjects of the 
proxy firm’s voting recommendation regarding the accuracy of information used to create 
recommendations. And Sec. 15H(h) of H.R. 5311 would have required the appointment of a 
compliance officer. Sec. 15H(l) would have required proxy firms to make the methodology 
behind their recommendations available to the public. 
 With just a glance, it is evident that the requirements under H.R. 5311 are not unique to 
many of the requirements that are a part of registration under the Investment Advisers Act. 
Under the Advisers Act, as with H.R. 5311, there is disclosure of conflicts, assurance of 
compliance through review of compliance procedures and/or appointment of a compliance 
officer, record keeping of information regarding the proxy firm’s structure147  (for example, 
including information regarding the firm’s ethics practices148). What H.R. 5311 would have 
uniquely done is it would have specifically targeted regulation towards proxy-advisory firms – as 
opposed to investment advisers in a general sense. H.R. 5311 also had requirements of public 
disclosure that make it relatively distinct.  
This bill, like the proposed regulatory fixes mentioned again, fails to focus on the already 
existing duties of the investment advisers (and/or ERISA fiduciary) that have been tasked with 
                                                          
146
 Id. Sec. (b)(1)(B). 
147
 Infra, Part III, n. 129-32. 
148
 See 17 C.R.F. 257.204–2(a)(12)(i)  (Requires that investment advisers keep records of company ethics code). 
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voting in the best interest of their clients. Had Congress passed H.R. 5311, investment advisers 
would still be able to slide their duties to another party.  
In Sec. 15H(h)(2) of the Bill, Congress would have required that the Commission 
withdraw the 2004 Egan-Jones and 2004 ISS No-Action letters. While a withdrawal of the 2004 
Egan-Jones letter will address the issue that was created by the letter – e.g. many institutional-
investment organizations (investment advisers, particularly) utilized it as a reason to outsource 
their fiduciary duties to proxy-advisory firms – a mere withdrawal does not address the duties of 
the investment adviser who should be seeking the best interest of its client.  
Furthermore, a withdrawal of the SEC’s 2004 No-Action letter to ISS will remove the 
guidance to investment advisers that they should obtain information from prospective proxy-
voting firms to ensure that the firms that they are obtaining recommendations from are, in fact, 
independent. Thus, while a partial withdrawal of the 2004 Egan-Jones No-Action letter may be 
one step in the right direction (since it could remove the misconception that retaining a proxy 
firm ultimately removes conflict), H.R. 5311 would not have adequately addressed enforcement 
of the expectations and duties of the investment adviser (or plan fiduciary) who is initially hired 
to manage the portfolio before it is handed off to the proxy-advisory firm.  
PART IV 
REMOVING THE EXTRA LAYER OF CONFLICT AND CONFUSION:  
GETTING BACK TO BASICS, ADDRESSING THE DUTIES OF THE INVESTMENT 
ADVISER (AND ERISA-PLAN FIDUCIARY) 
 
 What proposals for regulation of the proxy industry have done are serve as a distraction 
to the real issue that impacts institutional shareholders. The real issue is governmental agencies’ 
failure to adequately articulate and enforce the expectations of investment advisers registered 
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under the Advisers Act (as well as fiduciaries that fall under ERISA) that are initially charged 
with managing shareholder assets.  
In How to Fix Our Broken Proxy Advisory System, James K. Glassman and J.W. Verret 
summarized this sentiment when they stated: “…[T]he main purpose of the 2003 SEC rule on 
proxies was to address problems caused by conflicts of interest between institutions and the 
shareholders whose assets they manage. In fact, the conflicts have merely been shifted to 
different firms.”149 This conundrum was largely created, as mentioned earlier in this paper, by 
the SEC’s issuance of the 2004 Egan-Jones letter.150 The Egan-Jones letter, in essence, 
established that investment advisers charged with managing portfolios could “wash their hands 
of conflict” if they retained an independent third party to aid them in assessing how to vote on 
proxies. Thus, as highlighted in this paper, investment advisers began to turn to proxy-advisory 
firms to alleviate themselves from potential conflict.
151
  
 However, ridding themselves of conflict was not the only reason that investment advisers 
(and ERISA fiduciaries) turned to proxy firms. The volume of proxy issues, caused, in part, by 
the SoP vote implemented by Dodd-Frank, also prompted investment advisers to turn to proxy 
firms.
152
 Thus, fixing the issue requires an acknowledgment that “mutual funds [and other 
fiduciaries] can’t possibly make considered judgments about tens of thousands of proxies, and 
that [it] is not in their best interest to do so.”153  
The issue of proxy volume, however, is a matter that the SEC and DoL have already 
addressed in the past. In its 2008 Interpretive Bulletin, the DoL set forth that “fiduciaries also 
                                                          
149
 Glassman, supra, n. 58 at 21 (2013). 
150
 Id. at 26. 
151
 Id. 
152
 Id. at 9-10. See also Infra, Part I, No. 3(a). 
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 JAMES GLASSMAN & J.W. VERRET, MERCATUS CTR. GEORGE MASON UNIV., HOW TO FIX OUR BROKEN PROXY 
SYSTEM, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, 28 (2013), available at, 
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need to take into account costs when deciding whether and how to exercise their shareholder 
rights, including the voting of shares.”154 [Emphasis added]. And, when passing Rule 
275.206(4)–6, the SEC noted that there will be times when choosing not to vote on a proxy will 
be in the best interest of an investment adviser’s client because the cost would outweigh any 
benefit to the client’s plan.155 Thus, instead of focusing on vigorously regulating the proxy-
advisory industry, both the SEC and DoL should shift their focus towards clarifying these two 
initiatives to ensure that investment advisers (and ERISA-plan fiduciaries) are voting proxies 
efficiently, making sure that an adequate cost-benefit analysis has been carried out.
156
 The SEC 
and DoL should also specifically note that the costs of retaining and properly overseeing a proxy 
firm should be factored into a fiduciaries decision to vote or not vote a proxy. 
On December 29, 2016, the DoL back-tracked its emphasis on a cost-benefit analysis by 
withdrawing its 2008 Interpretive Bulletin and replacing it with Interpretive Bulletin 2016-1, 
which reinstates Interpretive Bulletin 94-2.
157
 The DoL does still maintain that plan fiduciaries 
are to “vote proxies on issues that may affect the value of the plan's investment.”158 To further 
add to the confusion, however, the DoL also said that “in some special cases, voting proxies may 
involve out of the ordinary costs or unusual requirements… (such as voting proxies of foreign 
corporations); [i]n such cases, a fiduciary should consider whether the plan's vote, either by itself 
                                                          
154
 DoL 2008 Interpretive Bulletin, supra, n. 43 at 61733. 
155
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: PROXY VOTING BY INVESTMENT ADVISERS, 
RELEASE NO. IA-2106, VOTING CLIENT PROXIES, available at, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm#llA2a 
156
 Glassman, supra, n. 58 at 29 (2013) (Glassman and Verret acknowledge that the DoL has not enforced its 2008 
Interpretive Bulletin and that neither the DoL or SEC has “reconciled a need for a benefit-cost analysis with 
universal active proxy voting policy requirements.” These two authors propose limiting proxy voting requirements 
of mutual funds and pension plans “so that these institutions will  be the sole arbiters of when it makes sense to vote 
using active analysis of the question at hand);” see also Charles M. Nathan, Proxy Advisory Business: Apotheosis or 
Apogee?, THE HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. AND FIN. REG. (March 23, 2011), available at, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/03/23/proxy-advisory-business-apotheosis-or-apogee/. 
157
 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN 2016-1 9-10 (2016), available at, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/2016-31515.pdf  
158
 Id. at 13-14. 
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or together with the votes of other shareholders, is expected to have an effect on the value of the 
plan's investment that warrants the additional cost of voting.”159 The DoL noted, in this 2016 
Bulletin, that its 2008 interpretation may have served as a means to discourage plan fiduciaries 
from voting on proxies.
160
 It is too early to determine the effect that this interpretive bulletin 
could have, but it could, very well, further encourage fiduciaries to vote every proxy (or most 
proxies) as a means of ensuring that they are complying with their fiduciary duties – being that 
the language of the 2016 Bulletin suggested that the 2008 Bulletin’s withdrawal was based on 
the fact that it may have discouraged voting. Thus, a reinstatement of the 2008 Interpretive 
Bulletin, along with further guidance that conveys to fiduciaries that they must consider the costs 
of retaining and overseeing proxy firms in their cost-benefit analysis, would more fittingly 
ensure that proxies are voted with care – and that initial plan fiduciaries are able to more 
adequately assess proxies.
161
 
 H.R. 5311 and some academics have argued that a withdrawal of the 2004 Egan-Jones 
letter is needed.
162
 And, at first glance, this appears to be an appropriate direction towards a 
solution; after all, time and time again this paper has noted that it was one of the root causes of 
the creation of the proxy-advisory dependence. However, a vital piece of information was 
included in this 2004 Egan-Jones letter. The Commission, in this same letter, also said that 
advisers who were concerned about conflicts could simply disclose such conflicts to their clients 
and request consent to proceed.
163
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 See generally Nathan, supra, n. 74. 
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 Glassman, supra, n. 58 at 30 (2013). 
163
 Egan-Jones Letter, supra, n. 26 (specifically footnote No. 5) (citing U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: PROXY VOTING BY INVESTMENT ADVISERS, RELEASE NO. IA-2106, RESOLVING 
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 Thus, a withdrawal of the 2004 Egan-Jones No-Action letter is not necessarily a fix to the 
overarching issue; it might just serve as a Band-Aid to the issue. An adequate solution would be 
to imbed portions of the Egan-Jones letter within current Rule 275.206(4)–6. Amended, the rule 
would read that advisers under the Advisers Act are to: 
(a)[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to 
ensure that [it] vote[s] client securities in the best interest of clients, which procedures 
must include how [it] address[es] conflicts that may arise between [its] interests and those 
of [its] clients; 
(b) disclose to clients how [it] may obtain information from [it] about how [it] voted with 
respect to their securities; and  
(c) describe to clients [its] proxy-voting policies and procedures and, upon request, 
furnish copy of the policies and procedures to the requesting client. 
(d) if an investment adviser cannot carry out their duty due to a conflict of interest, the 
adviser must disclose the conflict to its client and obtain the client’s consent before 
voting on behalf of the client’s securities.  
(e) if the investment adviser utilizes a proxy-advisory firm, whether or not that proxy-
advisory firm is also registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the 
investment adviser must disclose such use to the client, in addition to the following 
information: 
(i) potential conflicts of interest that the proxy-advisory firm may have, including 
the firm’s corporate structure and relations that it or any of its parent companies 
or subsidiaries may have with corporate issuers of securities. 
 (ii) potential inadequacies or limitations in the information provided by the firm. 
 (f) if the investment adviser utilizes a proxy-advisory firm, whether or not that proxy-
advisory firm is also registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the 
investment adviser must obtain the client’s consent to retain the proxy-advisory firm 
before voting on behalf of the client’s securities. 
  
 Provisions (d)-(f) above would serve as amendments to the initial rule, and they would 
only apply to registered advisers under the Advisers Act. 
  
 What this amendment does is it extends and codifies portions of the Egan-Jones letter. In 
the Egan-Jones letter, the Commission noted that a conflicted investment adviser could disclose 
such conflict to their client and seek client consent to continue voting on the client’s behalf. 
Thus, this principle should be extended to investment advisers who retain proxy-advisory firms 
King Scholar Seminar 
Spring 2017 
 
38 
 
by requiring that advisers disclose the use of the proxy firms to clients and ask for client consent 
to utilize them when voting the client’s proxy. This solution acknowledges the inherent structural 
flaws found in proxy firms. It acknowledges that the very use of a proxy firm could hinder the 
best interest of the shareholder/beneficiary (because of these firms’ conflicted structure) even if 
information about their practices is disclosed. As such, proxy firms’ usage should be treated as a 
conflict would be treated if the investment adviser himself or herself was directly conflicted. 
 Some may argue that proxy-advisory firms will be further encouraged to withhold 
information on the basis that clients will vote against the use of these firms. However, those that 
are currently registered under the Advisers Act will have to continue to disclose relevant 
information to the SEC (and their clients) and retain relevant policies, regardless. No matter how 
the impact would be carried out, this solution puts the impetus on the initial fiduciary to ensure 
that the services they are utilizing are adequate – which might mean that the adviser will choose 
firms that are registered over those that are not.  
 This approach puts more power in the hands of the client or beneficiary of institutional-
investment organizations. After all, it was at the SEC roundtable in 2013 that Chair White stated, 
“exercising the vote on important issues is one of the most significant rights that investors 
have”164 Thus, if it is of such importance to the investors (who are, ultimately, the 
clients/beneficiaries), it should be the clients/beneficiaries who have the ultimate say on the 
decision of an initial plan manager’s choice to retain a third party that could be conflicted. 
 In addition to an emphasis on cost-benefit analysis and further disclosure-and-consent 
requirements from investment advisers/plan fiduciaries, the SEC should also continue – and 
possibly increase – its enforcement actions, sending the message that it will hold investment 
                                                          
164
 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, TRANSCRIPT OF PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROUNDTABLE, p. 0008, 
lines 6-10 (December 5, 2013), archived at, http://perma.cc/Z57U-QNGW 
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advisers accountable as it did in 2009 when it pursued its first enforcement action against an 
investment adviser regarding its usage of proxy-firm advice
165
 – albeit that it was six years after 
Rule 275.206(4)–6 was enacted. Furthermore, an amendment to Rule 275.206(4)–6 will also 
enable to Commission to make sure that investment advisers not only have written policies to 
address conflicts, but that they are also disclosing information they specifically have about proxy 
firms, in addition to seeking client consent on usage of these firms. 
CONCLUSION 
 The main issue at hand is that investment advisers (or plan fiduciaries) have turned to 
proxy firms, who are not directly managing the plan or its assets and who, based on their 
structure, are inherently conflicted. Although these investment advisers/plan fiduciaries are 
required to monitor this delegation of authority, the regulatory framework currently does not 
adequately impose assurance that this occurs. Thus, the most-effective solution to the proxy-firm 
dilemma is threefold: It requires an emphasis on reducing investment advisers’ (plan fiduciaries’) 
view that every proxy must be voted; disclosure/consent in the usage of proxy firms and the 
SEC’s enforcement of investment advisers’ duties in regards to proxy-firm usage.  
 By encouraging investment advisers to conduct cost-benefit analysis – and pushing them 
away from voting all proxies – investment advisers can then focus on voting on necessary 
proxies more efficiently, arguably weakening their dependence on proxy firms.   
When proxy firms are needed – because they may be; investment advisers are not always 
going to be experts in all matters that come up on proxies – disclosure and consent should be 
required because proxy firms harbor inherent possibilities for conflict. And, to ensure that all of 
                                                          
165
 Center on Executive Compensation, supra, n. 31 at 64, 75 (citing Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, SEC 
Enforcement Action Focuses on Investment Adviser’s Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures (2009)).  
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these above-mentioned moving parts are effective, the SEC should vigorously enforce the duties 
of investment advisers to further ensure compliance.
166
  
                                                          
166
 The Department of Labor (as mentioned in Footnote 22) has enacted a rule (the “Fiduciary Rule”) that would 
expand the definition of “fiduciary” under ERISA. See generally Fiduciary Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (April 8, 
2016), available at, http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=28806. The Fiduciary Rule 
became effective June 7, 2016 and was set to be applicable April 10, 2017. However, on February 3, 2017, President 
Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum directing the Department of Labor to examine this rule, putting the fate 
of the rule at a stand-still, See https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-
regulations/completed-rulemaking/1210-AB32-2)). The Department of Labor has said that it will delay the roll out 
of the rule by 60 days, meaning it will not begin to go into effect until June 9, 2017. See Kristina M. Zanotti, Ruth E. 
Delaney, David R. McCandless, Amanda M. Katlowitz & Robert L. Sichel, K&L Gates Discusses Fiduciary Rule 
Delay – Important Compliance Takeaways, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, April 14, 2017, available at, 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/14/kl-gates-discusses-fiduciary-rule-delay-important-compliance-
takeaways/#.WPCk-v3uts0.email. There is a possibility that proxy-advisory firms will be captured under the 
Fiduciary Rule if it does go into effect. The plain language of the rule sets forth that advice regarding the 
management of securities or other property within the term “investment advice” includes recommendations on proxy 
voting (unless made to a broad class of investors); thus, there is a possibly that proxy-advisory firms will be under 
the purview of the Department of Labor pursuant to this rule. See Fiduciary Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,967 (April 8, 
2016). 
